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BOOK REVIEW 
 
Brian Lightbody, Philosophical Genealogy I: An epistemological reconstruction of 
Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 
2010). 
 
In Volume One of Philosophical Genealogy: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Nietzsche and 
Foucault’s Genealogical Method, Brian Lightbody uses epistemological reconstruction to analyze the 
genealogical works of Foucault and Nietzsche. He argues that such an undertaking is merited due 
to a lack of scholarly consensus on genealogy, despite myriad extent criticisms. He writes 
“without answering what, precisely, genealogy is, one cannot criticize it in any lucid nor detailed 
manner” (5). Lightbody argues what is needed is nothing short of a schema that details the aims, 
methods and techniques of genealogy. In doing so, however, Lightbody also seeks to break with 
the extent literature on genealogy in another fashion, as he writes “what I propose to do is to use 
the techniques, distinctions and concepts developed in recent analytic philosophy to show that we 
can have our cake and eat it too. We can provide a rigorous justification of genealogy while 
preserving its novelty, its profundity, its fecundity” (5).  
To start, Lightbody contrasts genealogy to what he deems “traditional forms of 
historiography”—monumental history from Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations and whig 
historiography (7). This section of the text suffers from the choice of examples. Although 
Lightbody identifies Francis Fukuyama and Hegel as potential candidates of influential whig 
historians, it is unclear to me who would qualify as an influential monumental historian. If these 
methods are anachronistic, then it makes little sense to qualify genealogy against them, rather 
than other methods used by contemporary historians or philosophers. 
In the next section, Lightbody develops a set of points that seem crucial for his argument 
that genealogy is an epistemically justified method, and that Nietzsche and Foucault are both 
practitioners of it in a similar fashion. As stated in the preface, genealogy, while concerned with 
value, is not a kind of value theory, and as Lightbody writes “though value theory and ethics are 
often regarded as closely synonymous if not co-extensive terms by many philosophers, it should 
be made clear at the outset that genealogy’s investigation into the value or values is not limited 
merely to the ethical realm” (ix). Lightbody argues that genealogy is concerned with more than 
just ethics, and, following Foucault, identifies power and truth as central concerns for a 
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genealogist. Power, truth and ethics are the three categories that Lightbody organizes his 
discussion around, and he claims that they hold for Nietzsche as well. He also introduces some 
important qualifications, narrowing his discussion of Foucault to the works produced between 
1971-1980, and identifying On the Genealogy of Morals as the primary site of Nietzsche’s oeuvre to 
which this work refers (21).  
Lightbody turns our attention to Nietzsche’s remarks about Herbert Spencer1 and points 
out that in order to be both logically consistent and critical of other historians, Nietzsche must 
consider genealogy to be “epistemically meritorious” in reference to other historical methods (33). 
Lightbody considers the importance of this quotation to be under-estimated in secondary 
literature on genealogy, and in the second and third chapters, analyzes how the issue of epistemic 
merit relates to both ontological and epistemological problems of the body, and then further 
argues for the coherence of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. One section which merits further attention 
is called “Optical Perspectivism,” and the subject is Nietzsche’s infamous ocular metaphor of 
perspective. 2  In this section Lightbody provides a fascinating criticism of another analytic 
philosopher, Brian Leiter. Lightbody argues that genealogy is able to use both “doxastic and 
non-doxastic” evidence, and in doing so moves beyond questions of motive, intention and 
sentiment (54). From this standpoint, he criticizes Leiter’s use of Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘forms 
of life’ as a comparison to Nietzsche’s understanding of how context relates to interpretations and 
facts. Lightbody argues that the poverty of Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ is that it allows 
community standards to operate as an unquestionable given. In Lightbody’s words: “the 
contextualist does not provide a non-doxastic (or casual) account of truth. Surely, a proper 
epistemology must take into account the non-doxastic as well as the doxastic aspects of any form 
of empirical inquiry [...] In essence, Leiter’s modest objectivity is too modest because it could only 
represent the squint, the nook, the corner, the slug perspective of the herd—the insight of the 
common” (129-130). A genealogist cannot allow community standards to operate as 
non-interrogable contexts as this would fly in the face of the goal of the method. In Lightbody’s 
words, “it must be possible to justify the accuracy of some perspectives over others and it must 
also be possible to affirm that perspectives are creative, and dynamic interpretations and 
re-interpretations of the world” (131).  
In the fourth chapter, Lightbody analyzes the methods and techniques of the second essay 
of On the Genealogy of Morals and the chapter “The means of correct training” in Discipline and 
Punish. He demonstrates that both Nietzsche and Foucault use a combination of evidence in the 
present time and distinct historical methods, and rely on neither exclusively. He claims that 
Nietzsche’s will to power is “both a metaphysical doctrine and constitutive of an empirical 
research program: it can be tested” (148). Through this discussion, Lightbody argues that 
Nietzsche and Foucault’s genealogical investigations share a high degree of similarity, that they 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollindale (New York: 
Random House INC, 1989), First Essay, Section 3, 27. 
2 Ibid., Third Essay, Section 12, 119. 
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share a research method in “empirically verifiable, and, therefore, empirically falsifiable terms” 
(182). To my knowledge, this is high praise for the genealogical method from an analytic 
philosopher.  
Some might consider a book on Foucault and Nietzsche to be a scholastic exercise. They 
are, it seems to me, not the intended audience of this book. Philosophical Genealogy is a book for the 
naysayers—those who associate thinkers like Nietzsche and Foucault with obscurity and 
irrationality. Lightbody’s work certainly moves beyond summary, as he claims, and treats with 
depth and insight the issues that surround an epistemological justification of genealogy. 
Lightbody provides a nuanced attempt at reconstructing a schema of the genealogical method 
and in the process develops an interesting account of genealogy as “a naturalistic account of 
historical events and phenomena” (184). Certainly the text merits further attention from scholars 
interested in genealogy, or those interested in the ontological and epistemological problems 
associated with Foucault and Nietzsche’s work. 
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